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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
-v- ) 
EUGENE ANDREINI, ) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16518 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement of facts is provided to 
clarify the questions arising from respondent's Brief at 
pages 5 and 9. These facts, as developed below, will 
serve to demonstrate how the appellant was prejudiced by 
the states' depositions, and how he was injured by his 
inability to respond to them. 
On September 11, 1978, before the preliminary hearing 
and before the trial in the instant action, the Carbon County 
Attorney's Office deposed several witnesses, among them, 
William Robertson, William Crissman, and Ken Oviatt. Evidently, 
the Carbon County Attorney Office acted under the authority 
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of the Utah Code Ann. s 77-45-20 (1971), which states 
in substance that the County Attorney shall have the 
right, upon application to the District Court for good 
cause shown, to subpoena witnesses and depose them. ThE 
attorney for the witnesses shall be notified of such 
deposing so he can be present. Such depositions were 
taken but never was application made to the District Coc 
by the County Attorney, nor was good cause shown. Also, 
no notice of taking depositions was sent to defendant m 
his counsel, nor were any of the witnesses allowed to cc 
sult an attorney or have one present during the depositi 
I 
THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO TAKE 
DEPOSITIONS IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
A 
THE CLAIH IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD AND BY AFFIDAVIT. 
As the attached affidavit of the trial judge inct 
the motion to take deposition was made at the beginning 
the trial and was denied by Judge Baldwin. The motion \·: 
made in open court the morning of the trial, before the 
trial judge and opposing counsel. 
B 
APPELLANT HAS SHO~l THAT THESE 
DEPOSITIONS \,'ERE NECESSARY .-'.ND TtL\T 
THE DENIAL 1 • .JAS PREJVDICIAL. 
-2-
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As was already stated in appellant's brief on 
pages 4 thru 7, such a ruling by the trial court judge 
was reversible error. Even Rule 8l(e) U.R.C.P. was not 
designed to deprive a defendant of his constitutional 
rights. 
What respondent states regarding defendant's right 
to take a deposition under Section I (B) of his brief 
applies equally well to the prosecution. Never once die 
the prosecution make application to the district court to 
take these depositions. Never once did the prosecution 
show any good cause for the taking of depositions, nor made 
any allegations that the witnesses to be deposed were ill, 
about to die or about to leave the court's jurisdiction. 
Since there was total statutory non-compliance by the 
prosecution, why should they be allowed to profit thereby, 
i.e. being able to wave the defective depositions over 
the heads of the witnesses with threats of impeachment and 
perjury to coerce them to tell what the prosecution thinks 
is true. The defendant certainly never did obtain that 
kind of an advantage. 
The denial to take the depositions was prejudicial 
for the above reasons as well as the fact that defendant 
\vas denied that opportunity. The defendant was never able 
to threaten any of the prosecution's witnesses with impeach-
ment or perjury. 
-3-
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Respondent's brief delves into the right of 
defendant to take depositions under prescribed conditions. 
That brief overlooks the way in which the law was violatec 
by the prosecution as it relates to depositions. 
To allow respondent to violate the law and profit 
thereby, yet not afford an opportunity to defendant to 
equalize the effects of that violation operates as a pre-
judice against defendant. 
The effects of violation are unmeasured, yet the 
unlawful 'Ln:Z'luence •.vas there. The effect of the prosecu-
tion's ex parte deposition was to support and to compel. 
To suggest, because the prosecution controlled the line o: 
questioning, they were not interested in exculpatory 
evidence. 
Certainly, the deponents must have been aware of 
the state's adversarial position to defendant; therefore, 
they must have felt induced to cooperate. Also, no one 
was there, other than the prosecution, to voir dire or 
cross-examine the witnesses, which would have helped assu: 
that the witnesses did not respond inaccurately or inco~­
pletely to the enthusiastic, one-sided questions of the 
prosecution. Naturally, the aspects of recollection favo: 
able to the state's case would have been reinforced. HhL 
all other recollection was not. 
-4-
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Once the witnesses made these statements under 
oath, the witnesses were "locked in" to their testimony. 
That coupled with the last minute threat of the prosecution, 
would have made it so they could not afford to admit error 
in their recollection. They could no longer feel free to 
respond according to their contemporaneous, spontaneous 
recollection of facts as presented during the trial. The 
effect of the above compulsion was to "chill" their testim::my 
-to thwart a full disclosure of the facts at both the 
preliminary hearing and the trial, as well as affecting their 
demeanor by causing them to appear more apprehensive and less 
confident; thus, less credible. 
This immeasurable impact of the prior sworn testimony 
falls directly upon defendant. These witnesses were his -
they comprised his case in chief; therefore, any "chilling" 
effect fell directly upon the merits of the defense. Further, 
by threatening these witnesses, the prosecution stepped over 
I 
the line of fair play and conscionable conduct expected of 
a public officer in pursuit of truth, creating reversible 
prejudice. 
Confronted by this coercive situation, the defense 
requested of the court permission to depose the witnesses 
in order to assume a "balance" at trial. The court denied 
the motion, despite the fact that it was fully aware of the 
-5-
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prior ex parte depositions. This was reversible error. 
Speaking of confessions, but relative and analago,_ 
to the facts presented by this case is the statement in 
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 42 L.Ed. 568, 577, 11 
S.Ct. 183 (1897): "[F]or the law cannot measure the force 
of the influence used, or decide upon it's effect upon thE 
mind of the [witnesses], and therefore [should] exclude 
the [depositions and their impeachment purpose] if any 
degree of influence has been exerted." 
II 
A?PELLANT'S RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION HAS BEEN 
DENIED SINCE CROSS-EXAMINATION WAS IMPROPERLY 
LIMITED. 
At trial, defense counsel was curtailed from con-
ducting a thorough cross-examination at several points. 
trial judge sustained the prosecution's objections at' sever 
points that the questions were irrelevant and argumentati 
To the contrary, the defendant was attempting to elicit 
responses highly material to the defense, and the trial 
court's denial of such cross-examination constituted reve: 
sib le error. 
In United States v. Alford, 282 U.S. 687 (1930) 
the United States Supreme Court held that a denial of re~ 
able latitude in cross-examination '.vas prejudicial error' 
-6-
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that it was not necessary to show that the cross-examination, 
if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending 
to discredit the testimony in chief. In Davis v. Alaska, 
415 U.S. 308 (1976) the United States Supreme Court stated 
that denial of the right of effective cross-examination was 
contitutional error of the fi~st magnitude which no amount 
of showing of want of prejudice could cure. And in Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) the court held that if 
there is a denial of the right of confrontation of the 
principal witness(es) against the defendant, the conviction 
must be reversed unless the appellate court can state beyond 
a reasonable doubt that no prejudice occurred. (Emphasis 
added) . 
This court has recognized the value of cross-examina-
tion many times in the past. As stated in Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 
(1959), the purpose of cross-examination is to give adversary 
counsel the opportunity not only to inquire into uncertainties 
pertaining to the testimony in chief, but to inquire into 
credibility; and whatever may make plain, modify or contra-
dict the evidence should be allowed. Even though the trial 
court generally has discretion to control cross-examination 
within reasonable limitations, he may not so reject it so 
to prevent inquiry into matter having a direct bearing on 
-7-
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the issued. Again in Oberg v. Sanders, lll Utah 507, 18 
p. 2d 229 (1947) this court reaffirmed the above by stat: 
that the testimony of a witness is no stronger than wher; 
it is left on cross-examination. In the preceding cases 
as well as many others, this court has reversed the deci: 
of the trial court based upon the improper restrictions 
exacted upon trial counsel in his pursuit of a full eros 
examination. See State v. Peek, l Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 
(1953). Appellant maintains that in the case at bar sue 
restr:.:::::.:.::-.ns as were Dlaced upon defense counsel constit. 
reversible error. 
Respondent, in his brief at 9, avers that the ques: 
posited to the state's chief witness were irrelevant anc 
argumentative. To the contrary, trial counsel was direc: 
his questions to the witness in order to establish facts 
inferences of merit. Counsel was attempting to elicit f: 
the complaining witness the extent of his injuries, clea: 
a material element.to be proven by the state, as well as 
the likely cause of the witness' injuries. (TR 33) 
The affirmative defense of self defense would nece 
ily involve the state of mind of the victim. Counsel wa 
denied cross-examination designed to expose the fact tha 
the witness indeed had exhibited hostility toward the dei 
in an encounter with the defendant's wife at the Hollov7 
-8-
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Bottle prior to the incident involved at trial. To deny 
the defendant the opportunity here to develop his defense 
of self defense was clearly reversible error. 
Respondent, in his brief, states that the appellant 
has a dual burden in establishing reversible error; that 
the error was committed by the trial court; and that such 
error resulted in clear prejudice. Such a conclusion should 
be limited to the facts of the case to which respondent 
refers. In that case cited by respondent, State v. Maestas, 
564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977) this court cited State v. Smelser, 
13 Utah 2d 347, 463 P.2d 562 (1970). In Smelser, the court 
recognized that the information sought to be produced from 
the witness was simply cumulative - it had already been 
elicited. Because of that, the court was willing to rule as 
a matter of law that the denial of further cross-examination 
was not prejudicial. In Maestas, supra, the same reasoning 
was followed by the court - Justice Hall stating: "Courts 
have found no prejudice where information that may be brought 
out by further questioning was already before the jury, either 
from the testimony of others or by implication from the 
witness' own testimony". 
In the case at hand, the information sought to be 
elicited was never before the jury. Since that information 
-9-
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was material to the defense, a denial of the same is 
reversible error. 
Since the gravamen of defendant's case was self 
defense, it was necessary for the defense to establish 
the state of mind of the victim, his past actions toward 
defendant, as well as the amount of force the victim used 
which had to be repelled by defendant. With the trial 
court's denial of this particular part of the cross-exami: 
ation, defendant was unable to fully develop his defense 
of self ~efense. Such is reversible error. 
The complaining witness was able to testify under 
direct, the way he wanted; however, by denying defendant 
the effective right of cross-examination, the complainant 
testimony went unchallenged. 
CONCLUSION 
The attached affidavit of Judge Baldwin should al. 
any argument that a proper record of the defendant motion 
was not before this reviewing court. The motion was made 
and denied as is now attested to by Judge Baldwin. 
The effect of the trial judge's denial of defense' 
motion to take depositions was highly prejudicial to defe 
in that defendant was unable to balance out or cure the :: 
proper taking of the depositions by the prosecution. As 
-10-
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before stated, the prosecution never made proper 
application to the district court since no good cause 
was shown, i.e., that any of the witnesses were leaving 
the jurisdiction, were ill or about to die, etc. The 
witnesses did not have their attorneys available or present. 
Defense was never notified of the taking of the depositions; 
hence, were unable to effectively counter the same. The 
fact of the unlawful dspositions coupled with the threats 
made by the prosecution on the eve of trial had a "chilling" 
effect upon defendant's witnesses' testimony. The influence 
there was immeasurable; hence the trial judge's denial 
should be reversed. 
The denial of defendant's right to effectively cross-
examine the complainant prejudiced him in that defendant was 
effectively denied the right to develop his affirmative 
defense of self defense. Such denial vitiated any fair trial 
to which defendant was entitled. Defendant, under his rights 
guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution as well as the Utah 
Constitution, is entitled to develop fully any potential 
defenses he has in a criminal trial. This he was prohibited 
from doing. 
For the above stated reasons, Appellant urges this 
Court to reverse the conviction rendered in the court below. 
-11-
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DATED this 27th day of August, 1980. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
HANSEN .AND HANSEN 
~ c I r I } ~~c By J±: ',L- ); I ·~..L( '/" 
Attorneys o'r Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and cor 
copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to the 
Attorney General at the State Capitol Building on this 
1.-'jt~ day of August, 1980. 
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ADDENDUM 
AFFIDAVIT OF TRIAL JUDGE 
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, being first duly sworn deposes 
and says: 
l. That he was the presiding trial judge in the 
trial of State of Utah vs. Eugene Andreini, held in the 
District Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, on April 
24 and 25, 1979. 
c.i 2. That the attorney for defendant, Phil L. Hansen, ~ ~ 7Ld~ ~ -;::;£· .. ..t.. -·~ ~"1!7· c <..... ~ 
in the morning of April 'l4, 1980,11 made a motion before affian~"c? 
to take the depositions of the potential witnesses involved ~ 
in the case. 
3. That affiant denied defendant's motion to take 
the deposition of witnesses. 
DATED this :2 .;-
STATE OF UTAH w. STiillt.l~e E'V.A~:s 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE BY~~~~~~~~ 
SUBSCRIBED TO AND SWORN before me this __ ~--
August, 1980. 
Hy Commission Expires: 
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